Abstract. Dragon stream cipher is one of the focus ciphers which have reached Phase 2 of the eSTREAM project. In this paper, we present a new method of building a linear distinguisher for Dragon. The distinguisher is constructed by exploiting the biases of two S-boxes and the modular addition which are basic components of the nonlinear function F . The bias of the distinguisher is estimated to be around 2 −75.32 which is better than the bias of the distinguisher presented by Englund and Maximov. We have shown that Dragon is distinguishable from a random cipher by using around 2 150.6 keystream words and 2 59 memory. In addition, we present a very efficient algorithm for computing the bias of linear approximation of modular addition.
Introduction
Dragon [1] is a word-oriented stream cipher submitted to the eSTREAM project [4] . Dragon is one of the focus ciphers (Software) which are included in Phase 2 of the eSTREAM. During Phase 1, Englund and Maximov presented a distinguishing attack against Dragon [2] . Their distinguisher is constructed using around 2 155 keystream words and 2 96 memory.
Unlike Englund and Maximov's work, we use a different approach to find more efficient distinguisher. In a nut shell, we first derive linear approximations for the basic nonlinear blocks used in the cipher, namely, for two S-boxes and for modular additions. Next we combine those approximations and build a linear approximation for the whole state update function F . While combining these elementary approximations we use two basic operations that we call cutting and bypassing. The bypassing operation replaces the original component by its approximation but the cutting operation replaces the original component by zero. Then, we design the distinguisher by linking the approximation of the update function F with the observable output keystream for two specific clocks. Building the best distinguisher is composed of two steps. First, all the linear masks for the internal approximations are assumed to be identical. Hence, the mask for distinguisher holding the strongest bias can be found easily. Next, the bias of the distinguisher is estimated more accurately by considering the dependencies among internal approximations. This goal is achieved by allowing the different internal masks to approximations that are used to build the distinguisher. In result, the bias of our distinguisher is estimated to be around 2 −75.32 when 2 59 bits of internal memory are guessed. Hence, we claim that Dragon is distinguishable from the random process with around 2 150.6 words data complexity and with 2 59 memory complexity. This complexity is better than the one presented in [2] . Our distinguisher is also described explicitly by showing the best approximations of the nonlinear components of the cipher. In contrast, the previous best attack by Englund and Maximov used a statistical argument to evaluate a bias of the function F . This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief description of Dragon. In Section 3, a series of linear approximations of nonlinear components of Dragon is presented. And then, a distinguisher is built by combining the approximations. In Section 4, the distinguisher is improved by considering the dependencies of intermediate approximations. Section 5 concludes the work.
A brief description of Dragon
Dragon consists of a 1024-bit nonlinear feedback register, a nonlinear state update function, and a 64-bit internal memory. Dragon uses two sizes of key and initialization vector that is 128 or 256 bits and produces a 64-bit (two words) output every clock. The nonlinear state update function, which is called the function F , takes six state words (192-bit) as input and produces six words (192 bits) as output. Among the output words of F function, two words are used as new state words and two words are produced as a keystream. The detail structure of the F function is displayed in Figure 1 . Suppose that the 32-bit input x is split G2   G3   H2  H1  H3   ?  ?  ?  ?  ? ?
into four bytes such as x = x 0 ||x 1 ||x 2 ||x 3 where x i denotes a single byte and || denotes a concatenation. Then, the functions G and H that are components of the F function are constructed by using two 8 × 32 S-boxes, which are called as S 1 and S 2 , in the following way.
Using the F function, the keystream is generated as follows.
For a complete description of Dragon, we refer the reader to the paper [1] .
A linear distinguisher for Dragon
Let n be a non-negative integer. Given two vectors x = (x n−1 , . . . , x 0 ) and y = (y n−1 , . . . , y 0 ) where x, y ∈ GF (2 n ), let x · y denote a standard inner product defined as x · y = x n−1 y n−1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ x 0 y 0 . A linear mask is a constant vector that is used to compute an inner product of a n-bit string. Let us assume that we have a function f : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n for some positive integers m and n. Given a linear input mask Λ ∈ GF (2 m ) and a linear output mask Γ ∈ GF (2 n ), the bias of an approximation Λ · x = Γ · f (x) is measured as follows.
where x ∈ GF (2 m ) and runs through all possible values. Then,
Note that given q independent approximations each having the bias ǫ, the combination of q approximations has the bias of ǫ q according to the well-known Piling-up Lemma [3] .
Approximations of functions G and H
According to the structure of the functions G and H, the essential components of the functions G and H are the two S-boxes: S 1 and S 2 . Hence, the linear approximations of the functions G and H can be constructed by combining approximations of S 1 and S 2 appropriately. In particular, for our distinguisher which will be described next subsection, we need special forms of approximations displayed in Table 1 . Note that the approximations of the function G use an input and an output masks which are identical, while those of function H use only an output mask. The reason for this will be explained in Subsection 3.3. We call the approximations of the form Γ · G(x) = Γ · x bypassing approximations, whereas the approximations of the form Γ · H(x) = 0 cutting approximations. Table 1 shows the examples of such approximations that hold high biases.
Approximations of the function H Assume that a 32-bit x is a uniformly distributed random variable. If x is divided into four bytes such as x = x 0 ||x 1 ||x 2 ||x 3 , where x i denotes the i-th byte of x, then the approximation Γ · H 1 (x) = 0 can be represented as Table 1 . Cutting and bypassing approximations of the function G and H Hence, the bias ǫ H1 (0, Γ ) is computed as
where ǫ Si (0, Γ ) denotes the bias of the approximation Γ · S i (x j ) = 0. Due to the structure of the function H, the approximations Γ · H 1 (x) = 0, Γ · H 2 (x) = 0 and Γ · H 3 (x) = 0 are isomorphic when the input x is an independent random variable. Hence,
Approximations of the function G A 32-bit x is assumed to be a uniformly distributed random variable. If x is divided into four bytes such as x = x 0 ||x 1 ||x 2 ||x 3 , and a mask Γ is divided into four submasks such as
Hence, the bias ǫ G (Γ, Γ ) can be computed as follows
where ǫ Si(xj ) (Γ, Γ j ) denotes the bias of the approximation
Linear approximations of modular addition
Let x and y be uniformly distributed random vectors, where x, y ∈ GF (2 n ) for a positive n. Given a mask Γ ∈ GF (2 n ), a linear approximation of modular addition where an input and an output masks are Γ is defined as follows:
where the bias of the approximation is denoted by ǫ + (Γ, Γ ). Also, given a vector x, the Hamming weight of x is defined as the number of nonzero coordinates of x. 
where
If m is odd, then
Proof. See Appendix A.
For example, if Γ = 0x0600018D, the Hamming weight of Γ is 7 and W Γ = (26, 25, 8, 7, 3, 2, 0).
Corollary 1. Let m be a positive integer. Given a mask vector Γ whose Hamming weight is m, an approximation Γ · (x + y) = Γ · (x ⊕ y) has at most a bias of 2
Proof. See Appendix B.
Linear approximation of F function
According to the state update rule of Dragon, there is the following relation between two state words chosen at clock t and t + 15.
We know that a = B 0 and e = B 30 ⊕ M L where a and e are two words out of six input words of the F function. Then, we try to find the linear approximations Γ · a ′ = Γ · a and Γ · e ′ = Γ · e where a ′ and e ′ are two output words of the F function that are produced as a keystream. We regard the outputs of the functions G and H as independent and uniformly distributed random variables. This assumption is reasonable since each G or H function has unique input parameters at given clock t so that the output of the functions G and H are mutually independent. Hence, the functions G and H are described without input parameters in the following expressions.
The approximation of a ′ As illustrated in Figure 1 , an output word a ′ is expressed as follows.
Due to the linear property of Γ , we know that
By applying Approximation (1), we get
which holds with the bias of ǫ + (Γ, Γ ). Hence, we have
Next, the two types of approximations are used in our analysis: First, cutting approximations are used for the functions H 1 and H 2 . That is, we use Γ · H 1 = 0 and Γ · H 2 = 0 which hold the biases of ǫ H1 (0, Γ ) and ǫ H2 (0, Γ ), respectively. Intuitively, these approximations allow to simplify the form of the final approximation of the function F by replacing the output variables of a nonlinear component by zeros. Second, bypassing approximations are used for the function G 2 . That is, we use
that has a bias of ǫ G2 (Γ, Γ ). In this category of approximations we are able to replace a combination of output variables by the same combination of input variables. Then, we have
Finally, by applying Approximation (1) for the modular addition, we obtain
We know that
holds the bias of ǫ + (Γ, Γ ). Therefore, the bias of Approximation (6) can be computed from the biases of the component approximations as follows:
Since the 32-bit word a ′ is an upper part of a 64-bit keystream output at each clock, Approximation (6) is equivalent to the following expression.
where k 0 [t] denotes the upper part of a 64-bit k at clock t.
The approximation of e ′ As depicted in Figure 1 , an output word e ′ is described as
Similarly to the case of a ′ , we would like to obtain an approximation Γ · e ′ = Γ · e. To do this, we first apply Approximation (1) for modular addition and as the result we get
Next, we apply the cutting approximations for functions H 1 , H 3 and the bypassing approximation for the function G 1 . That is, we use the following approximations
that hold with the biases of ǫ H1 (0, Γ ), ǫ H3 (0, Γ ) and ǫ G1 (Γ, Γ ), respectively. These approximations are plugged into the above relation and we obtain the following result
Finally, by applying Approximation (1) for modular addition, we can conclude that output e ′ and input e satisfy the following approximation
with the bias of ǫ e ′ (Γ,
Since the 32-bit word e ′ is a lower part of a 64-bit keystream output k at each clock, Approximation (9) is equivalent to the following expression.
denote the lower part of a 64-bit k and the upper part of a 64-bit memory word M at clock t, respectively.
Building the distinguisher
According to Equation (4), Approximations (7) and (10) can be combined in such a way that
By guessing (partially) the initial value of M , we can build the following distinguisher.
For the correctly guessed initial value of M , the distinguisher (11) shows the bias of
We implemented a mask search for the function F to achieve the distinguisher with the biggest bias. The space of a linear mask Γ contains 2 32 − 1 elements. For each mask Γ , the following procedure is performed to compute the bias given by Expression (12).
Step 1. For an input x that varies from 0 to 255, measure the biases of Γ · S 1 (x) = 0 and Γ · S 2 (x) = 0, respectively. Then, compute ǫ H1 (0, Γ ), ǫ H2 (0, Γ ) and ǫ H3 (0, Γ ).
Step 2. The mask Γ is divided into four submasks Γ = Γ 0 ||Γ 1 ||Γ 2 ||Γ 3 . For an input x that varies from 0 to 255, measure the bias of Γ · S 1 (x) = Γ i · x and Γ · S 2 (x) = Γ i · x for some 0 ≤ i ≤ 3. Then, compute the biases ǫ G1 (Γ, Γ ) and ǫ G2 (Γ, Γ ).
Step 3. Compute ǫ + (Γ, Γ ) using Theorem 1.
Step 4. Finally, compute ǫ D (Γ, Γ ).
Our results
We searched for a linear mask which maximizes the bias (12). Due to Corollary 1, the bias ǫ + (Γ, Γ ) decreases exponentially by the increment of the Hamming weight of a linear mask. Hence, there is a better chance to achieve higher bias when the Hamming weight is smaller. In result, we found that the best linear approximation of the function F is using the distinguisher (11) with the mask Γ = 0x0600018D. The bias of the distinguisher in this case is 2 −75.8 as listed in Table 2 . In order to remove the impact of the unknown state of the internal memory on the bias, we need to guess the first 27 bits of initial value of M L and 32 bits of M R . Hence, we need to store all possible values of the internal state which takes 2 27+32 = 2 59 bits. Table 2 . The bias of distinguisher
Improving the distinguisher
In this section, we generalize a method presented in Section 3. A new distinguisher can be built from the relation of (a, a ′ ) and (e, e ′ ) presented in Equations (5) and (8). A basic requirement for establishing a distinguisher is to apply the identical mask Φ to the state a at clock t and to the state e at clock t + 15, as stated in Section 3. However, this time, the other internal masks can be different, as shown in Figure 2 . We set up the six masks, {Λ 1 , · · · , Λ 6 }, for the components of the F and build the following approximations:
The component-wise approximations required for Approximations (13) and (14) are listed in Tables 3 and 4 . According to the well-known theorem [5] the correlation of approximations approximation bias Table 3 . Component approximations for Equation (13) approximation bias can be computed as a sum of partial correlations over all intermediate linear masks. For theoretical analysis of the theorem, we refer the reader to the paper of [5] . Hence, the bias of Approximation (13) is computed as a sum of partial biases induced by the masks of Λ 1 , Λ 2 and Λ 3 as follows:
Similarly, the bias of Approximation (14) using the masks of Λ 4 , Λ 5 and Λ 6 can be computed as follows:
Hence, according to Subsection 3.4, a new distinguisher can be derived from Approximations (13) and (14) as follows:
with the bias of
Experiments
In order to find the distinguisher holding the biggest bias, we need to search all possible combinations of Γ 2 and Γ 5 and test their biases by Equation (18). Furthermore, for each Γ 2 and Γ 5 , the computation of Equation (18) requires a large number of iterations due to the space that all the intermediate masks have. Hence, our experiments focus on reducing the overall space of the masks that are necessarily required for the computation of the bias of the distinguisher. To achieve this goal, we implemented two techniques that can remove a large portion of terms from the summation involved in Equation (18). First technique is to remove, from Equation (15) and (16), the unnecessary terms caused by the condition of ǫ + = 0. The approximations of the modular addition have non-trivial biases only in a portion of space which is determined by the values of an input and an output masks.
Lemma 1. Assume that the bias of the approximation
where b i stands for the i-th bit of Λ 2 , we assume that the most significant non-zero bit of Λ 2 is located in the bit position of b t where 0 ≤ t ≤ 31. Then, the bias ǫ
. In other words, we see that
Proof. See Appendix C.
According to Lemma 1, the iteration range of the biases (15) and (16) depends on the space of the output mask of the modular addition. For example, if
Next technique is to restrict, by some value, the correlations of the modular additions used in Equation (15) and (16) and to reduce the number of iterations. Namely, instead of iterating the full space of the intermediate masks, we use only relatively highly biased approximations of the modular additions for estimating the bias of the distinguisher. In the paper of [6] , authors proposed an efficient algorithm for finding all input and output masks for addition with a given correlation. This algorithm enables us to reduce the number of iteration for Equation (15) and (16) significantly. We restricted the effective correlation of the modular addition up to ±2 −24 , as suggested in [6] . Based on these techniques, we re-calculated the bias of the Distinguisher (17) and found that the bias is estimated to be 2 −75.32 . It is interesting to observe how the biases can be improved by considering the dependencies of the combinations of the approximation. Table  5 shows that the bias measurement without considering the dependencies can underestimate the real bias of the approximation. Due to the restrictions on computing resources, we searched the best distinguisher under the condition that Λ 2 = Λ 5 and we could not perform the experiment for the cases when the different values of Λ 2 and Λ 5 are allowed. Even though Bias (18) tends to be high when Λ 2 = Λ 5 , there is a possibility that two different values of Λ 2 and Λ 5 may lead to a distinguisher with a bigger bias. We leave this issue as an open problem.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a new distinguisher for Dragon. Since the amount of observations for the distinguishing attack is by far larger than the limit of keystream available from a single key, our distinguisher leads only to a theoretical attack on Dragon. However, our Table 5 . Comparison of the bias of the distinguisher computed by two methods analysis shows that some approximations of the functions G and H have larger biases than the ones expected by the designers. As far as we know, our distinguisher is the best one for Dragon published so far in open literature. In addition, we present an efficient algorithm to compute the bias of approximation of modular addition, which is expected to be useful for other attacks against ciphers using modular additions.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose that z = x + y where x = (x n−1 , · · · , x 0 ), y = (y n−1 , · · · , y 0 ) and z = (z n−1 , · · · , z 0 ). Then, each z i bit is expressed a function of x i , · · · , x 0 and y i , · · · , y 0 bits as follows.
If we define the carry R(x, y) as
By the definition, R(x, y) i has the following recursive relation.
First, we examine the bias of the Γ of which the Hamming weight is 2, i.e. m = 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that γ i = 1 and γ j = 1 where 0 ≤ j < i < n. Then, by Relation (19), Approximation (1) . Otherwise, p i−2 is determined recursively by the same technique used as above until p j−1 is reached. Hence, we obtain the following result. 
Therefore, the ǫ + (Γ, Γ ) is determined by only the difference between two position i and j of Γ . Next, we consider the case that Γ has an arbitrary Hamming weight, which is denoted m. Assume that we convert m into an even number m ′ by using the following technique. In result, the Γ is transformed to Γ ′ which has the Hamming weight of m ′ . Since the modular addition is linear for the least significant bit, ǫ + (Γ, Γ ) = ǫ + (Γ ′ , Γ ′ ). Hence, a new position vector for Γ ′ is defined as W Γ ′ = (w m ′ −1 , · · · , w 0 ) where 0 ≤ w j ≤ n. Now, we decompose Γ ′ into a combination of sub-masks which have the Hamming weight of 2. That is, Γ is expressed as
where Ω k is a sub-mask which has the nonzero coordinates only at position w 2k and w 2k+1 for k = 0, 1, · · · , 
